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Two distinct analytical techniques were used to develop
models in order to forecast monthly first term regular
enlistments in the United States Marine Corps. A multiple
regression model was derived based on its compatibility with
a theory of occupational choice, the intuitive appeal of the
explanatory variables, the past literature of manpower
supply, and the statistical significance of each variable's
impact on monthly enlistments. A second model was developed
by applying the Box-Jenkins methodology to the time series
of monthly enlistments spanning the period from July 1973
to June 1978. As a further refinement the residuals from the
multiple regression equation were treated as an original time
series and the Box-Jenkins technique applied to them. Then
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This thesis is concerned with the occupational choices of
young men and specifically the choice of enlisting in the
Marine Corps. The problem of whether sufficient numbers of
young men would choose the military as a career has been of
considerable interest since the advent of the All Volunteer
Force in early 197 3. For its part, the Marine Corps has had
analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses studying the
determinants of enlistment supply for some time. The author's
interest in the subject was stimulated by an "experience
tour" of six weeks duration at CNA during the summer of 13 7 8
while one of the manpower supply studies was in progress
.
The initial plan was to choose a mathematical model of the
supply function solely on the basis of a good statistical fit.
Subsequently, it became apparent that while the model should
indeed reflect- any patterns inherent in the enlistment data,
an additional criterion for selecting a functional form was
desirable. The form chosen should be deduced from, and con-
sistent with, a model of occupational choice as developed in
microeconomic theory [Refs. 3, 5, and 12].
A generally accepted, fundamental model of occupational
choice considers each young man to be faced with a choice
between enlisting or not enlisting. In this dichotomous
world each choice involves certain characteristics. These
may be thought of as enlistment attributes and non-enlistment
10

attributes. In principle, each set of attributes may be
described in terms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and
benefits. The first assumption is that an individual chooses
the set of attributes which maximizes his utility function,
that is provides him with the most pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits. It is further assumed that an individual may express
these non-pecuniary attributes in pecuniary terms. This
means that an individual, faced with enlisting or not is
able to put a monetary value on a potpourri of military
attributes such as length of initial enlistment; the oppor-
tunity for training; location and unit guarantees; benefits
available after active service; family separations; deploy-
ments overseas; discipline; and arduous working conditions.
He then adds this result to the explicit military wage and
compares this figure to a similarly derived opportunity cost
of his civilian opportunities [Refs. 3 and 8].
Given these assumptions, the potential enlistee may
determine a reservation military wage, M* , that would make
the sum of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from
enlisting just equal to the sum of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits of remaining a civilian. At this wage the poten-
tial enlistee would be indifferent between enlistment and
remaining a civilian. If the military wage, M, actually
offered the applicant exceeded his reservation wage, then
he would enlist. If it did not, he would not enlist. Refer-
ence 11 provides a comprehensive review of the economics of
11

job search when the applicant has information concerning
the distribution of these wage offers.
One expects differences in reservation wages among
potential enlistees. Such differences are derived from the
varying opportunity costs of enlisting and the perceived
differences in the non-pecuniary returns to military life,
of "tastes" for military service. For example, individuals
with excellent civilian opportunities and a strong aversion
to military service will, ceteris paribus, have a high
reservation wage. Thus, individuals may be arrayed according
to their reservation military wages, creating a frequency
distribution like Figure 1.
Figure 1
SHADED AREA IS CUMULATIVE NUMBER











The aggregate supply curve as a function of expected
military return (other determinants held constant) may be
derived by plotting the number who would enlist at each value







EXPECTED MILITARY WAGE, M
The supply curve in Figure 2 has been heuristically
derived for the most obvious tangible aspect of military
employment, the expected military wage. The other determinants
of the supply of military manpower which were held constant
may be categorized in several groups: (1) the dissemination
of information to potential recruits, (2) the employment and
earnings conditions in the civilian economy, and (3) the
population base from which the military draws its recruits
[Ref. 3]. The first category concerns recruiting activity,
which includes recruiters in the field, mailings, advertising,
and logistical support for the recruiting establishment. It
13

is expected that a larger recruiting effort, other things
being equal, would yield more enlistments.
The second category involves those factors that are
exogenous to military policy control. As an individual
formulates his opportunity cost of enlisting, he considers
not only the explicit civilian wage opportunities but also
the security associated with those offers as represented by
the unemployment rate. As the chances for civilian employ-
ment decrease (unemployment rises) , more individuals will
seek to enlist. Conversely, if civilian earnings opportuni-
ties are excellent, fewer enlistees would be expected. The
final factor is the population base from which potential
enlistees are drawn. If this is expanding one would expect
increased enlistments, ceteris paribus. Hence, the above
discussion implies that an enlistment supply function may be




M = military wages
R = recruiting effort
C = wages from civilian employment
U = unemployment in civilian labor force
P = relevant population base (e.g., 16-24 year old
high school graduate males)
14

There are two primary techniques for examining the
roles that the determinants of the enlistment decision process
have historically played: survey instruments and econometric
models of enlistment supply. Survey techniques allow the
analyst to explore aspects of the enlistment decision
process for which other, more "objective" techniques are
inadequate due to a lack of data. For example, the reasons
affecting an individual's "taste" for military service may
be analyzed. However, an econometric model of enlistment
supply enables the policy maker to sort out the individual
effects of the various factors that contribute to the supply
of enlistees. Furthermore, forecasts of future manpower
supply levels are possible under a variety of given circum-
stances. It is the purpose of this paper to model mathe-
matcially the supply function for male non-prior service
regular enlistees to the Marine Corps. Two analysis
techniques are utilized: multiple regression analysis and
the Box-Jenkins methodology. The problem, then, is to model
mathematically a suitable cohort of enlistees and to calcu-
late elasticities with respect to the appropriate explanatory
variables. The implications of policy decisions and economic
factors could then be assessed. Furthermore, the forecasting
accuracy of this multiple regression model could be con-
trasted with that of the model derived by the use of the Box-
Jenkins methodology. A review of the more pertinent studies
using multiple regression analysis will clarify both the




II. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON SUPPLY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS
A. THE GATES COMMISSION
The President's Commission on an All Volunteer Force,
popularly known as the Gates Commission, involved several
studies on the supply of military manpower. Harry J. Gilman
stated that one objective of those studies was to estimate
the elasticity of manpower supply with respect to military
compensation [Ref. 6]. In essence, the studies for the Gates
Commission used as a functional form for the supply equation
the log-linear model based on time series data for the period
1958 to 1968 (the one cross section analysis utilized data
from 1964) :
In E = a + a. In (NL/C ) + a In DP + e + seasonal dummy variables
(2.A.1)
where
E = E/P, the ratio of enlistments, E, to the
eligible population base P
M = expected military earnings during length of
p contract
C = expected civilian earnings during same period
DP = some measure of draft pressure
a. = regression coefficients
e = stochastic error term
16

A number of functions, including linear, log-linear, log-
complement, and logit functions were fitted to the data
[Ref. 7 and Table I] and statistical tests for goodness of
fit were unable to distinguish amongst them. The coefficient
of determination for the time series regressions were in
the range from .61 to .82. Therefore, the choice of the
model was often due to the author's preference, ease of
manipulation, or economic interpretation. In the log-linear
model which was ultimately adopted by the Gates Commission,
the elasticities with respect to the explanatory variables
are constant. This may be shown by proceeding from the
basic definition of elasticity as the percentage change
in say y for a given percentage change in x:
E = |y/YAx/x
and noting that in the limit Ay/y is the differential for
the logarithm:
&- = d(In y)
y
Rewriting this expression for the elasticity of the enlistment
rate with respect to the military to civilian pay ratio one
has
:
d(ln v) d(ln Er)




















































































































from equation (2.A.1). Gilmer justified the constant elas-
ticity by assuming that manpower shortfalls under the All
Volunteer Force would be relatively small. Hence, over such
a short range the elasticity could be assumed to remain con-
stant. One would only expect a declining elasticity if
large manpower deficits were encountered, forcing the ser-
vices to enlist at the margin people whose preferences
obviously lay elsewhere.
The Gates Commission studies made several other general
assumptions. The models describing the enlistment decision
imply that young men have only two occupational choices
:
civilian employment or military service [Refs. 2 and 7].
The options of remaining in school or enlisting in another
service (for the single service studies) are not included.
Additionally, demand restrictions could cause queues for
enlistment and result in individuals being turned away.
Hence, enlistments for these periods would not represent
points on the theoretical supply curve. It was assumed that
high school graduates in the higher mental groups were not
constrained in this manner [Refs. 2, 6, and 7] . These
mental groups were established during World War II to
insure a more equitable allocation of new manpower within
the Army. However, to extend this concept to all the ser-
vices, in May of 1951 the Secretary of Defense prescribed
identical mental and physical standards for initial induction
into any service and assigned service quotas based on an
applicants mental category. The categories, listed below,
19

are still derived from an enlistee's scores on a standardized
battery of tests given to all applicants for military
service
.





V 9 and below
B. THE LOG-LINEAR MODEL REVISITED
Three years after the publication of the Gates Commission
findings in November of 1970, Jehn and Carroll selected the
log-linear model in their study of first-term Navy accessions
[Ref. 10]. Their objective was to identify the effects of
pay, advertising, and recruiting on new enlistees in the Navy
The model included an attempt to account for more than one
career option by adding as explanatory variables other ser-
vices recruiters and advertising expenditures. The basic
model was:
ln(|) = B Q + B 1 In W + B 2 In (1-u) + B 3 In NA + B 4 In NR
+ B
5
In OA + Bg In OR + dummy and seasonal variables
E = enlistments
p = 17-20 year old population of civilian males
20

W = military to civilian wage ratio
U = unemployment rate
NA = Navy advertising
NR = Navy recruiters
OA = other services advertising
OR = other services recruiters
Jehn and Carroll also limited their enlistment data to
those in the upper mental groups in order to insure that the
time series of enlistments would represent the "true" supply
of volunteers. Furthermore, the authors discounted both
military and civilian expected income over a four year period
The employment rate was matched to the cohort of enlistees.
Although the study's results were inconclusive (only the
coefficient of the unemployment variable was significantly
different from zero) , Jehn and Carroll did attempt to account
for a greater number of influences on the supply of volunteer
enlistees to the Navy than had the Gates Commission studies.
C. THE LINEAR MODEL ADVOCATES
When the Gates Commission published it's recommendation
to replace the military draft with a purely voluntary system,
the role of economic factors in governing the supply of
military manpower came under increased analysis. John C.
Hause developed a linear model of the supply equation to
assess the important impact of changes in employment oppor-
tunities on first-term enlistments [Ref. 9]. As in the
21

previous studies, the author limits his data on enlistments
to the higher mental groups. Similarly, he deflates these
enlistments by the corresponding population cohort of quali-
fied males. In this manner he eliminates any trend due to
cohort size. That is, if tastes for military service are
unchanged over the period of analysis and the enlistments
from a particular cohort are not demand limited, then the
ratio of enlistments to the corresponding cohort size should
be constant for given values of the independent variables.
Hause's study differed from the others reviewed here in
that his only explanatory variable was the unemployment rate
This is undoubtedly a specification error. His linear model
was based on quarterly data from 1957 through 1973. While
such restricted casualty precludes meaningful comparisons
of elasticities with the other studies, Hause did innovative
work by incorporating in his linear model the concept that
the probability of an individual enlisting in the service
varies with the length of time he has been unemployed. This
was accomplished in the following way.
Let p(x) be the conditional probability of enlisting
given the applicant has been unemployed for a period of
length t. If the fraction (density function) of the popula-
tion cohort that has been consecutively unemployed for a
period t is written f(i), then the expected enlistment rate
from this source at the current point in time t is:
t





where tQ is the longest consecutive length of time any
currently unemployed person has been unemployed. Now if
p(i) is constant over time then the unemployment rate is:
t
u(t) - / f( T ) dx
t-t
o






p(i) = C-, a constant.
The assumption that the conditional probability of enlisting
is independent of the length of unemployment is not particu-
larly plausible. Hence, Hause assumes p(i) = c
?
t from which




where T is the average duration of unemployment for the
population cohort generating the enlistments at time t.
Using a linear model including seasonal dummy variables,
2
Hause obtained R values around .86. However, when one
excludes the seasonal dummy variables, the consequent
23

conditional coefficient of determination was about .41 when
either "unemployment" variable was included in the regression
Alan E. Fechter developed a linear model of Army enlist-
ment behavior during the Vietnamese Conflict [Ref. 4]. He
utilized the following regression equation:
E = B n + B, DP + B VN + B. X. + e1 2 l it
where
E = enlistment rate
DP = measure of draft pressure
VN = index of Vietnamese Conflict based on number
of casualties
X- = explanatory variables such as the military
to civilian pay ratio and unemployment
Quarterly enlistment results during the period 1953 to 1968
were analyzed. In concert with previous studies, Fechter
limited the enlistment data to white males in the top three
mental categories. These figures were then deflated by the
eligible white male civilian population, aged 17 to 20.
Military pay was defined as the sum over the period of enlist-
ment of cash pay plus in-kind benefits all discounted at
30%. Civilian pay included the earnings of persons who were
comparable to the enlistees in selected characteristics, such
as age, race, and education. It was also appropriately dis-
counted. Fechter ' s study included linear models with a pay
24

ratio as an explanatory variable and those with both mili-
tary and civilian pay as separate explanatory variables.
The pay elasticites for the latter linear models were con-
sistently greater than those for the relative pay models.
2Both absolute and relative pay models had R values of about
.71.
D. THE LOGIT MODEL
Richard V.L. Cooper [Ref. 3] chose the logistic econometric
model for three reasons: (1) such a model binds the depen-
dent variable between and 1; (2) the resultant supply
curve has an S shape; and (3) the relevant elasticities
initially increase and then decrease over the range of the
independent variables. The supply function has the form:
S =
-(B + Bn W + B~R + B,U + B.D + a
1 + e
which, with some algebraic manipulation, may be put into
linear form:








D + a (2.D.1
where
S = enlistment rate
W = wage ratio





D = seasonal dummy variable
a = stochastic error term
Following tradition, Cooper restricts his semiannual enlist-
ment data over the period from July 1970 to June 1976 to
high school graduates in the top three mental categories.
He deflated these figures with a weighted average of the 17
to 21 year old male high school graduate population since
age cohorts have different probabilities of enlisting. The
unemployment rate was matched with the age group of the enlistees
Military pay for the multiple regression using Marine Corps
enlistments was discounted over a period of three years to
reflect the most common enlistment. The discount rate used
on the Regular Military Compensation figures was 20%. Regular
Military Compensation for military personnel includes base
pay, quarters and subsistence allowances, plus the tax
advantage resulting from the latter two categories of remunera-
tion being tax exempt. In calculating the discounted stream
of income over the enlistment period, Cooper assumed that
enlistees spend the first four months as E-l's, the next
eight months as E-2*s, the following year as E-3's, and
thereafter as E-4's. Additionally, he assumed the applicant
was unmarried for the first two years of his enlistment and
married thereafter. Cooper noted that including an indepen-
dent variable measuring the ratio of the number of Marine
recruiters in the field to the number of effective Army
26

recruiters increased the explanatory powers of equation
(2.D.1) by about one third.
The multiple regression equation derived was
ln[-
1 _
] = -3.727 + 1.649W + 1.715R + 1.648U - 0.162D + 1.64
where the variables are as previously defined and r* equals
the ratio of Marine to Army recruiters. The coefficient of
determination for the Marine enlistment data was in the range
from .5 to .7 compared to .7 to .9 for the regressions using
Navy and Army enlistment data.
The most comprehensive study of the supply of enlistees
to the services was done by D.M. Amey , A.E. Fechter, D.W.
Grissmer, and G.P. Sica in June of 1976 [Ref. 1] . After
providing an excellent review of previous research in the
field, the authors proceeded to analyze quarterly Army enlist-
ment data disaggregated by level of schooling and mental
category for the years 1958 through 1972. The authors inves-
tigated a variety of models based on the logit supply function
n
ln(I^|-) - Bo + I B i Xit + ut
i=l
where
e = enlistment rate in quarter t
:. = military and civilian pay, the unemployment
rate, probability of being drafted and otheier
explanatory variables to account for seasonal
27

variations and political crises during the
period under study.
u, = stochastic error term
The models were differentiated by changing the set of
independent variables. Relative and absolute pay variables
were combined with various seasonality assumptions in the
so-called static models. The model was termed dynamic when
the enlistment rate lagged one quarter was included as an
independent enlstment determinant. The authors ranked the
models by the accuracy of their forecasting ability as
measured by the lowest root mean squared error of the
residuals;




n = number of observations in time series
e = observed enlistment rate
e = expected enlistment rate based on multiple
regression results
The two top-rated models excluded seasonal dummy variables
and included military and civilian pay as separate explantc
variables vice as a pay ratio. Additionally, the top-rated
model included the enlistment rate lagged one quarter as an
independent variable whereas the runnerup did not.
28

The study by Amey et al., also utilized three other
basic models to test volunteer response to pay and unemploy-
ment changes. The results were based on more recent enlist-
ment time series data (1971-1976) from each of the services





= B6 + I B.5. t + BA + B 2 Uk
i=l
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n e (wk uk )
i=l
E, = volunteer rates for month t
W, = pay ratio for month k where k may represent
a lag of +6, +4, +2, 0, -2, -4, -6
U, = unemployment rate for month k where k may
represent a lag of +6, +4, +2, 0, -2, -4, -6
B. = regression coefficients
6., = 1 if i = k MOD (12), otherwiselk
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The models were estimated using ordinary least squares
techniques. A stepwise procedure was used to determine which
lag of the independent variables was the most appropriate.
It is not clear from Ref. 1 why the logit model was abandoned
in favor of the above three types. However, Cooper [Ref. 3]
concluded that all of the models previously discussed gave
consistent results in the sense that the regression coeffi-
cients had the intuitively appropriate signs. The results
for Marine Corps volunteer rates are set forth in Table II.
Table II
RESULTS OF AMEY ET AL. REGRESSIONS*
Dependent Coefficient of pay
Variable Model ratio (lagged 6 months)











all coefficients significant at .01 level
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Ill- THE SUPPLY EQUATION FOR MARINE ENLISTMENTS
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
The brief analysis of occupational choice developed in
the introduction resulted in the "S" shaped supply curve of
Figure 2. Such a curve is called logistic and may also be
derived from the solution to the ordinary differential equation
dM " as - bS
where, for example, at military wage M equals M , the enlis-
ment rate S equals S . The solution to this differential
equation has the form:
-a(M-M )
S(M) = aM /[bMQ + (a- bMQ )e ° ]
which results in the logistic or S shaped curve. This implies
that the elasticity of the enlistment rate with respect to
military pay will first increase and then decrease as pay is
increased, and also indicates the asymptotic hypothesis
that the enlistment rate can be made as close to one as
desired by simply raising military pay sufficiently.
Thus, the logit functional form fulfills the additional
criterion of being consistent with the assumed model of
occupational choice. The explanatory variables to be included
in the supply equation were chosen by considering their
31

intuitive appeal, the availability of data, and the previous
literature concerning the supply of military manpower.
B. THE VARIABLES
1. The Civilian-Military Pay Ratio: CMPR
As a measure of the relative earnings opportunities
in the civilian and military occupations a pay ratio was
calculated. The national estimate of weekly earnings of
production and non-supervisory workers on industry payrolls
was used as a measure of the prevailing civilian wage oppor-
tunity for the population cohort of eligible enlistees. This
figure was divided by the weekly earnings of an enlisted man
in pay grade E-3 with three years of service and a dependent
wife. The military wage included the tax advantage resulting
from the tax exempt status of the subsistence and quarters
allowances. Although a Lance Corporal with over three years
service and a wife is not the profile of the average first
term enlistee, an applicant considering enlistment in the
Marine Corps would probably consider promotional opportuni-
ties and the various allowances when making a wage comparison
with any civilian offers. Hence, it was considered appro-
priate to use a higher wage figure than that given initially
to a basic recruit. Furthermore, the higher wage is more
comparable to what one would calculate by discounting an






The figure used for unemployment was the deseasonalized
estimate of the national unemployment rate for persons aged
16 to 19. This statistic was chosen over the national
unemployment rate for all persons over 16 years of age
because it more accurately reflects the milieu of the teenage
job seeker. The relatively small number of monthly enlistments
would have no appreciable impact on the unemployment rate
used in the multiple regression. This avoids any "feedback"
relationship from the dependent variable to the independent
variable which could bias the regression results.
3. Monthly Leads From National Print Media: LEADS
The values of this explanatory variable are the
monthly number of qualified leads obtained from postcards
which were included in national printed media advertisements.
A lead is considered qualified if the respondent meets mini-
mum age and educational levels. This variable was chosen
to act as a proxy for the impact of advertising on enlistments.
A more direct measure of advertising input such as appropriated
funds is difficult to use since the actual placement of an
ad may bear little relation to when the money was obligated.
4 A Dummy Variable: DJ
A dummy variable only takes on the values or 1 and
is designed to account for anomalies in the factors influ-
encing the values of the dependent variable. In this case
a dummy variable was assigned the value 1 for December of
33

1976 and otherwise. This was to correct for the abnormally
large number of enlistments in that month due to the expira-
tion of educational benefits under the G.I. Bill on 31
December 1976.
5. The Number Of Marine Recruiters: EFFREC
The values of this variable are the number of Marine
recruiters who were actually on duty each month during the
period of the time series. They represent actual canvassers
and exclude headquarters' staff and those recruiters who
were sick or on leave during a given month.
6
.
The Dependent Variable: LSV
The initial hypothesis was that the number of monthly
enlistments would be a function of the above independent
variables (displayed in Table III) . However, the functional
form of this dependence, the logit model/ requires a trans-
formation of the dependent variable to achieve a linear form.








UNEM+B LEADS+B DJ+a) ( 3 - B - 1 )
1 + e
where the independent variables are as praviously defined
and the dependent variable S is an enlistment rate. To
insure that the observed number of monthly enlistments was
not restricted by Marine Corps policy and was therefore truly
representative of points on the supply curve, the analysis
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school graduates in the top two mental categories (variable
VSMART, Table III). The assumption was that possible enlist-
ments from this cohort were never turned away due to a quota
restriction; a fairly safe assumption for the Marine Corps.
Thus the enlistment rate was derived by dividing the monthly
enlistments by a corresponding population cohort consisting
of male high school graduates, aged 16 to 24, not enrolled
in college. This eliminated any trend due to the size of
the eligible population for enlistments. If tastes for mili-
tary service are unchanged over the period of analysis and
the enlistments from a particular cohort are not demand
limited, then the ratio of enlistments to the corresponding
cohort size should be constant for given values of the inde-
pendent variables.
When the logit function is transformed to linear
form so that the technique of multiple regression may be
applied, it becomes:
LSV = LN(y^r) = B + B,CMPR + B 2EFFREC + B 3UNEM




So the dependent variable used in the multiple regressions
S
was the natural logarithm of the quantity (jTg-) where S
equals the enlistment rate calculated using only enlistments
by high school graduates in the top two mental categories.
These were assumed to be a true indication of the supply
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of manpower to the Marine Corps and not demand constrained
in any manner.
C. THE REGRESSION RESULTS
In order to properly assess the outcome of the multiple
regression analysis, it is necessary to understand the basic
assumptions that are made when applying the technique [Ref. 13].
There are four basic assumptions, the first of which is that
the dependent variable is linearly related to each of the
independent variables. If the relationships are not linear
then the methodology of regression analysis cannot be accurately
applied to the problem. Although the logit model has a non-
linear form initially (equation 3.B.1), with a transformation
and a little algebra it may be put in linear form (equation
3.B.2) .
The second basic assumption in regression analysis is
that of constant variance of the random errors. This assump-
tion is simply that the variance of the residuals remains
constant over the range of the time series. A lack of con-
stant variance may be recognized by a pattern in the residual
values. If this problem is not corrected, tests of statis-
tical significance become meaningless. For example, one could
not legitimately test to see whether a regression coefficient
was significantly different from zero. This could result in
the assumption of causality between the dependent variable
and an independent variable where none existed.
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The third basic assumption of multiple regression is
that the residuals are independent of one another. Any
given residual should not be a function of the error terms
preceeding or following it in the time series. The existence
of such a relationship is called serial correlation and
implies that either an important independent variable has
been omitted or the wrong functional form has been used in
the regression equation. Thus, rather than the regression
equation explaining the underlying pattern of the data and
having random error terms, these residuals still contain
part of the basic pattern. The presence of serial correla-
tion may be detected by noting a pattern in the residuals and
by observing the value of the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic,
calculated from the residuals themselves. Generally, for
a data set of the size used in this study, a D-W statistic
value between 1.5 and 2.5 implies a lack of serial correlation
The final basic assumption is that the residuals are normally
distributed. If this assumption is not met, tests of signi-
ficance and confidence intervals developed under the normality
assumption will not be meaningful.
In arriving at a final choice for the set of independent
variables to be included in the regression analysis, it was
necessary to determine the appropriate lag for these varia-
bles. For example, an annual military pay raise in October
may not influence enlistments until five or six months later.
Similarly, a recruiter takes time to become proficient so
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that an increase in canvassers one month may not have an
impact until several months have passed. All of the indepen-
dent variables previously explained (except DJ) were lagged
from one to six months and several regressions were run to
discover those variables that significantly contributed to
the pattern of enlistments. The seemingly endless number
of combinations was pared considerably by allowing a variable
to enter the equation only once. For example, the civilian
to military pay ratio (CMPR) could not be in the same equation
at two different lags. The final selection was made based
on the intuitive appeal of the regression equation and the
statistical significance of the results. Using monthly
enlistments over the period from December 1973 to June 1978
(Figure 3), a total of fifty-five observations, the multiple
regression results were:
LSV = LN (:—=) = -2.669 - 5.647 (CMPR5) + .lOO(UNEM)
.
i ~ S (11.655) (6.163)
.672(DJ) + a (3.C.1)
(3.33)
where
CMPR5 = civilian military pay ratio lagged 5 months
UNEM = unemployment with no lag
DJ = dummy variable for December cf 1976
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The partial F-statistic appears in parenthesis below each
coefficient. They are all significant at the 10% level.
The percentage of the variation in monthly enlistments
explained by the model, the coefficient of determination
2
or R value, was .42.











From the above it is clear that the signs of the coefficients
of the explanatory variables are what one would expect
intuitively. An increase in civilian relative to military
pay will decrease the enlistment rate. Conversely, an
increase in teenage unemployment will increase the enlistment
rate.
A measure of the relative impact of changes in the explana-
tory variables on the enlistment rate is elasticity, the
ratio of percentage changes between the enlistment rate and
a given explanatory variable, X., with the others held constant
The formula for elasticity using the logit model is:
-:b.x.
i i
£ . = B, (l-S)X, = 3,X






i = elasticity of the enlistment rate with
respect to explanatory variable X-
B i = regression coefficient of variable X.
S = enlistment rate
X^ = explanatory variable i
Using June 1978 as a basis for calculating the elasticities








The results imply that if the civilian to military pay ratio
was increased 1% and all other variables were held constant,
the enlistment rate of male high school graduates in the top
two mental categories would fall off by almost 6%. If teen-
age unemployment increases 1%, the enlistment rate would
increase about l-s-%. These elasticities are compared to these
calculated from other studies shown in Table IV. Although
the elasticity with respect to pay appears high compared with
the results of these other studies, one should note that only
in a log-linear model are the elasticities constant. Other-
wise they depend on the regression coefficient and the values
of the explanatory variables in the period for which the
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elasticities derived from various studies other than to
get a sense of the impact of changes in the various explana-
tory variables on the enlistment rate.
The most surprising result of the regression was the
exclusion of the variable representing recruiters, EFFREC.
When forced into the equation, its regression coefficient was
never statistically different from zero and had a negative
sign indicating that the more recruiters in the field the
less the enlistments. Intuition and experience would indi-
cate that recruiters play a pivotal role in the enlistment
decision of a quality applicant. However, it may be that such
highly qualified applicants are shoppers and seek out the
various services' recruiting offices themselves, thereby
eliminating the "canvassing" part of recruiting which requires
the manpower. Furthermore, the other services could be out-
recruiting the Marine Corps in the quality market and adding
additional recruiters has not changed this. In contrast,
a loss of recruiters hasn't hurt either. Perhaps the mystique
of the Marines coupled with the opportunity to serve in
technical fields do not need to be extolled to the discrim-
inating applicant.
The exclusion of the variable LEADS is not as disturbing.
When forced into the equation its regression coefficient
evidenced the same symptoms as EFFREC ' s . However, there
was no way to disaggregate the variable in order to see how
many of the post cards were returned by male high school
44

graduates in the top two mental categories. Consequently,
there may indeed be no connection between these quality
enlistments and the mass of returned postcards received
each month.
The four basic assumptions of the multiple regression
model were considered satisfied with the exception of the
independence of the residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistic
for the multiple regression model was 1.08, indicating posi-
tive serial correlation among the residuals. This is not
surprising considering that no attempt to explain any
seasonal pattern in the monthly enlistment rate was made.
Combining the methodologies of multiple regression and Box-
Jenkins is an excellent technique to correct this problem.
The Box-Jenkins method is developed in the next section.
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IV. THE BOX-JENKINS METHODOLOGY
A. THE ADVANTAGES OF BOX-JENKINS
The multiple regression analysis previously discussed
required that a model be chosen on the basis of the analyst's
experience or some pertinent economic interpretations. Use
of the Box-Jenkins methodology does not require that such a
specific model be chosen. Instead, the researcher applies
a specific technique to analyze the data and iteratively
eliminate inappropriate models until he is left with the most
suitable one. The Box-Jenkins methodology is particularly
well suited to analyzing a complex time series in which a
number of observations, influenced by seasonal and/or cyclical
factors, are taken over discrete, equally spaced periods of
time, and a forecast of some future time period is desired.
In an attempt to discern the underlying pattern in the time
series, the general method illustrated in Figure 4 is applied
[Ref. 13]. It should be noted that the Box-Jenkins fore-
casting method shares with other time series techniques the
fundamental assumption that these past patterns of the data
will repeat themselves in the future.
B. THE GENERAL APPROACH
The Box-Jenkins forecasting method is composed of four
stages. In stage 1 a specific model that can be tentatively
entertained as the one best describing the situation under
analysis is chosen. Stage 2 involves fitting that model to
46

THE BOX-JENKINS FORECASTING METHOD
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the available historical data (in this case regular Marine
Corps monthly enlistments) and analyzing the deviations
between the observed values of the time series and those
values predicted by the tentative model. If the model is not
deemed adequate by this statistical procedure, the approach
returns to stage 1 and an alternative model is specified.
Once an appropriate model has been isolated, stage 3 and then
stage 4 are pursued. These latter stages involve developing
a forecast for some future time period and implementing a
plan for updating the model and acting on the implications
of the forecasts
.
C. THE ROLE OF AUTOCORRELATION
In constructing a model of a time series one needs to
describe the relationship between a current observation and
previous observations of the same series. This concept of
correlation is a key tool in arriving at the underlying pattern
of a time series. Correlation is a measure of the association
of two variables. When these variables are observations from
the same time series the degree of association is called auto-
correlation. Autocorrelation is measured by an autocorrela-
tion coefficient which like the correlation coefficient, may
take on values between -1 and +1. For example, if observa-
tions in a time series which are above the mean are followed
by similarly valued observations four time periods later,
one would say that the observations four periods apart are
positively autocorrelated. The closer the autocorrelation
48

coefficient is to +1 the stronger the positive autocorrela-
tion. That is, if the last observation in a time series was
above the series mean, the strong positive autocorrelation
at four periods in our hypothetical example would suggest
that a practical choice for a forecast four periods in the
future would also be a value above the series mean. However,
autocorrelation does not imply causality.
Thus, autocorrelations provide important information about
the pattern underlying a time series. In a set of completely
random observations the autocorrelation among successive
values will theoretically be zero, whereas observations of
strong seasonal or cyclical character will be highly auto-
correlated. Figure 5 presents the autocorrelations, denoted
r, , of different time lags of monthly gasoline consumption
in Great Britain [Ref . 13] . These autocorrelations reveal a
strong seasonal pattern of 12 months duration since the
highest results among the set of autocorrelation values occur
every 12 successive months. It is this kind of information,
derived from the plot of the autocorrelations for various
lags (called a correlogram) , that can be utilized by the
Box-Jenkins approach to arrive at the optimal forecasting
model. Note that no assumptions need be made about the
observations or their pattern to calculate the autocorrela-
tion coefficients. The correlogram may be used to reveal
the type of time series under analysis and its pattern.
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D. THE MODEL TYPES
The Box-Jenkins. method is based on three general classes
of models for any time series: (1) the autoregressive or
AR model, (2) the moving average or MA model, and (3) the
mixed autoregressive-moving average or ARMA model.
An autoregressive model has the form:
Y
t





where Y, is the dependent variable, such as monthly enlist-
ments, and Y , , Y t _ 2 > • ••# Y 4__ are tne independent or
explanatory variables which in this example are enlistments
from previous months (t-1, t-2, ..., t-p) . Finally, there
is a constant term 9 and an error or residual term which
o
represents random deviations that cannot be explained by
the model. The term autoregressive is used to describe the
above model since it is very similar to the multiple regression
equation described earlier:
Y = B,+ B,X, + B„X~ + ... + B X + e.
o 11 22 pp t
Now, however, the explanatory variables are replaced by
lagged values from the time series itself. The model postu-
lates that the enlistments in month t are influenced by those
of the past p months. The strength of a past month's influence
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is weighted according to its coefficient <{>; where i ranges
from 1 to p.
Unfortunately, not all time series may be handled with
just the pure autoregressive model. Some data are more
properly described using the moving average or MA model:
Y. = + e. - 6,e. , - 8-e^ - - ... - 9 e.
t o t 1 t-1 2 t-2 q t-q
where Y is again a time series observation such as monthly
enlistments and is a constant term. The model asserts
o
that the dependent variable is a function of the current and
previous values of the error term. The negative signs pre-
ceding the MA coefficients are merely a convention.
The final general class of time series models is the







Yt-1^2Yt-2 + --- + Vt-p + et- e iet-l- 9 2 e t-2
q t-q
This model presumes that future monthly enlistments, for
example, depend both on historical enlistments and the past
deviations or errors between those enlistments forecasted
by the model and those actually observed.
In order to simplify the notation involving the various
time series models, the backshift operator is introduced.
The backshift operator is defined as 3 where the exponent k





t-3- In genera1 ' B\BY^ = Y^ -, and B Y^ . , . l, Y = Yt , . The3 t t-1"
backshift operator may be combined in a polynomial such as
(l-B-B 2 )Y
t






Furthermore, standard mathematical operations apply to the
2backshift operator. For example, B(1-B)Y = (B-B )Y = Y , - Y
2
The three general models using the backshift notation are:





- <b BP )Y,_ = 9 + e,Y l Y 2 r p t o t













- 9 Bq )et
(3) mixed autoregressive moving average of order p and
q or ARMA(p,q)
(1 - (frjB- <|> 2B
2
- ...









- 9 Bq )e 4.q t
The choice of one of the three models and its degree can
be made by examining the autocorrelations and a set of related
statistics, the partial autocorrelations. The procedure
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involves selecting a tentative model based on an examina-
tion of the correlogram, calculating initial estimates of
the coefficients or parameters (the (f>'s, 6's, and 6 ), and
finally examining the autocorrelations of the models
'
residuals. If the model has been correctly fitted to the
time series data then these differences between the actual
and predicted values should be randomly distributed over the
time series. That is, their autocorrelations should be close
to zero and exhibit no pattern. However, should a pattern
be present the Box-Jenkins methodology provides for developing
a new model and repeating the analysis until the residuals
are randomly distributed. Then the final model may be used
for forecasting and policy decisions.
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V. THE APPLICATION OF BOX-JENKINS TO MONTHLY MARINE ENLISTMENTS
A. THE MODEL, STAGE 1
The Box-Jenkins procedure was applied to a time series
of monthly male enlistments in the regular Marine Corps over
the period from July of 1973 to June of 1978, a total of
sixty observations. In order to complement the multiple
regression analysis, the same data were used: the monthly
enlistments of high school graduates in the top two mental
categories as determined by the applicants' scores on the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery of tests (ASVAB)
.
The monthly enlistments, variable VSMART, are listed in
Table III and shown graphically in Figure 3.
The first step was to calculate the autocorrelations and
partial autocorrelations for the original data (Figs. 6 and
7) . The exponentially decaying sine wave pattern indicates
that the time series may be described by a mixed autoregressive
moving average model, i.e., ARMA(p,q). Fortunately, most
time series may be adequately described by models of low
order. That is, p and q generally take on values of less
than three. Prior to calculating any initial estimates of the
parameters for the ARMA(p,q) model a seasonal difference of
twelve months was imposed on the time series. From the plot
of the monthly enlistments in Figure 3, such a seasonal
pattern is evident. This differencing operation results in
a "smoother" time series which may be more accurately
55
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represented by the model ultimately chosen. Using the back-








B. THE MODEL, STAGE 2
Having selected a tentative ARMA(p,q) model, the parameters
((jj'SjO's, 9 ) were estimated and the autocorrelation function
for the residuals was analyzed. After several iterations
of this procedure it was apparent that the following model
adequately described the time series of monthly enlistments:
(1 - (j^B) (1 ~B 12 )Y
t





where Y is the number of male high school graduates in
mental categories I and II who enlisted in month t. The
constant is denoted by 9 and the error term by e^ . The
* o t
autoregressive coefficient is $, and the moving average
coefficient is 8, where the exponent s merely indicates
that the MA coefficient is associated with a backshift
operator of seasonal lag twelve.
















Rearranging terms and carrying through the backshift operator
the model is:
Y
t " hYt-l " Yt-12 + HYt-- s13 uo ' ~t "1 Ct-12
't = *lVl " *lYt-13 + Vl2 + 9 o + e t " 9 l Set-12
The interactive computer program entitled the Time Series
Editor [Ref. 14] was used to perform the calculations and
plot the various results. The final Box-Jenkins model for












t _ 12 (4.B.1)
The coefficients were statistically significant at the 5%
level. The correlogram for the residuals of the above model
is plotted in Fig. 8. The autocorrelations appear to be
randomly distributed along the time series and their values
are all near zero.
C. FORECASTING, STAGE 3
Having determined an adequate model by noting that the
autocorrelations between the residuals had no discernible
pattern and their values were all near zero, forecasts of
enlistments were made. Table V and Figure 9 show the results
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BOX-JENKINS TIME SERIES FORECASTS















































































In part A of the table the forecast origin was chosen as
December of 1977 in order to have an overlap of six months
between the actual number of enlistments and those forecasted
for a twelve month period. Although a month by month compari-
son between the known and forecasted enlistments is not
particularly enlightening, the model does capture the pattern
of enlistments for that period. It should also be noted
that the model incorporates enlistments lagged thirteen
months which, in forecasting the number for January of 1978,
would encompass the large "spike" at December of 1976 (Figure
9). This anomaly, caused by a rush of enlistments to take
advantage of the G.I. Bill benefits before they expired on
31 December of that year, certainly distorted the forecasts
for January through June of 19 78.
The forecasting results using a forecast origin of June
1978 are much more encouraging. Part B of Table V compares
the enlistment forecasts for the period July 1978 through
June 1979 with an identical period of the previous year. It
is evident from the table and Figure 9 that the pattern of
enlistments is repeated quite well by the model given in
equation 4.B.I. The confidence limits drawn on Figure 9 indi-
cate that one may be 90% certain that the predicted value
will fall within the indicated bounds. These statistical
calculations confirm the intuitive notion that the farther




VI. A COMBINED MODEL AND FORECAST COMPARISON
A. DEVELOPING THE COMBINED MODEL
The multiple regression model developed in Section III
satisfied all the basic assumptions except for the indepen-
dence of the residuals. In order to correct this last prob-
lem, the Box-Jenkins methodology was applied to the residuals
as if they were an original time series. Once an appropriate
model for the residuals was derived, it was combined with the
multiple regression model to forecast enlistments more
accurately.
The residuals from the multiple regression model (equation
3.C.1) were plotted along with their autocorrelations and
partial autocorrelations (Figs. 10, 11, and 12). From an
analysis of the autocorrelations a seasonal difference of
12 months was taken. Then the correlogram for the differ-
enced residuals, was plotted (Figs. 13 and 14). The decaying
sine wave pattern and the first two large spikes in the
partial autocorrelations suggested an AR(2) model. The final
plot of the autocorrelation function for the error terms
from this model indicates they are randomly distributed and
near zero (Fig. 15). The model for the residuals was:




) (1 - B
12 )z
t
= 9 Q + e t
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where Z is the residual value from the multiple regression
model and e is the error term for the autoregressive model





*l (Zt-l- Zt-13 ) + *2 (Zt-2- Z t-14' +Z t-12 + 9 o + et
Z
t * •




Let LSV _ equal the predicted values using the multiple
regression equation alone (equation 3.C.1). Then the pre-
dicted value for the combined model, LSV , is:
' c






- = .3407(Z -Z ) + .2596(Z
t _ 2
-Z
t _ 14 )
+ Z. _- - .03683
t-12
and the Z. 's are residuals derived from the multiple regression
model. That is, they are the differences between the actual
value of the dependent variable LSV and LSV .
B. THE FORECAST COMPARISONS
The various models have been developed in order to fore-
cast enlistments. The period January 1978 to June 1978 was
71

chosen as a forecast horizon since the actual enlistments
for these months were known. Table VI shows the results. As
measured by the root mean squared error, the combined model
is the best by far. However, the Box-Jenkins model does
include enlistments lagged thirteen months which for this
forecast period involves the non-recurring surge of enlist-
ments in December, 1976. This certainly influenced the
forecasted values (see Table V) . The multiple regression
equation still contains serial correlation in the residuals,
indicating that the pattern of the time series had not been
fully accounted for by such a model. Therefore, it was not
unexpected that the combined model more accurately forecasts
enlistments over the period chosen.
Unfortunately, the difficulty in forecasting with a model
involving multiple regression is one must also forecast the
values of the explanatory variables such as unemployment and
the civilian to military pay ratio. Thus, there is a com-
pounding negative effect on the accuracy of such forecasts.
The attractiveness of the Box-Jenkins approach is that the
analyst may let the time series speak for itself. However,
the basis of time series analysis is that the underlying
pattern will repeat itself in the future. So if the time
series of monthly enlistments contains such non-recurring
anomalies as the surge in December, 19 76, the forecasting


















Jan 7 8 487 413 ( 74)
•
252 (235) 350 (137)
Feb 7 8 448 466 (-18) 315 (133) 332 (116)
Mar 7 8 455 589 (-134) 365 ( 90) 450 ( 5)
Apr 7 8 362 391 (-29) 247 (115) 615 (-253)
May 7 8 384 321 ( 63) 289 ( 95) 625 (-241)




Z(Y. - Y. )
, 2
Y = actual value
Y = value predicted by model





Three models using two distinct analytical techniques
have been developed. A multiple regression model was derived
based on its compatibility with a theory of occupational
choice, the intuitive appeal of the, explanatory variables,
the past literature of manpower supply, and the statistical
significance of each variables impact on monthly enlistments
(equation 3.C.2). The Box-Jenkins methodology was applied
to the time series of monthly enlistments and a model of the
underlying pattern in the data was developed. As a further
refinement the residuals from the multiple regression equation
were treated as an original time series and the Box-Jenkins
technique applied to them. Then the two models were combined
and forecasts calculated.
A comparison of the enlistment forecasts made by each
of the models indicates that the combined model is best as
measured by the root mean square of the residuals. This is
undoubtedly true for short term forecasts of say only three
months. A greater forecast horizon favors the Box-Jenkins
approach since it is not necessary to also forecast teenage
unemployment or civilian pay to calculate the predicted
enlistments. There is somewhat of a dilemma in that multiple
regression allows the analyst to explore causal relationships
but hampers the important job of forecasting while the
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Box-Jenkins approach characterizes just the opposite. A
compromise may be reached by using the combined model for
short term forecasts and the Box-Jenkins approach for longer
projections where guesses at future values of the explanatory
variables are not necessary.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
The elasticities calculated from the multiple regression
analysis indicate areas for policy emphasis. However, the
choice of high school graduates aged 16 to 24 not enrolled
in college as the population cohort by which the monthly
enlistments were deflated upwardly biased the elasticities.
This may be seen from the logit expression for elasticity:
£. = b.X. (1 - S)
i li
where
e. = elasticity with respect to X.
b- = regression coefficient
X. = explanatory variable
S = enlistment rate
Using such a large population makes the enlistment rate very
close to zero. A more accurate def later, had it been avail-
able, would have been the percentage of that population cohort
in the top two mental categories. This smaller number would
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have increased the enlistment rates thereby lowering the
elasticities.
Nevertheless, the strong influence of the civilian to
military pay ratio on the enlistment decision of applicants
who are high school graduates and in the top two mental
categories indicates that military pay plays a crucial role
in attracting quality enlistees. This is a variable that
while not directly under the control of the services may
certainly be lobbied for. It may be that a salary system with
"in kind" benefits converted to cash compensation would
significantly increase the enlistees from this needed cohort
of young men.
The significant impact of teenage unemployment should
also be considered when assessing the Marine Corps' recruiting
efforts. Mathematically, a high unemployment rate is good
for the All Volunteer Force. An increasing minimum wage
and employers' preferring older workers are helping to main-
tain this indirect benefit to recruiting. It is ironic that
the services are undergoing recruiting shortfalls during
periods of high teenage unemployment. This should indicate
that if teenage unemployment is reduced to low levels as
envisaged in the recently passed Humphrey-Hawkins Full
Employment Act, then an even worse recruiting picture will
be in the offing. The Marine Corps and the other services
as well should promote cooperation with state and federal
employment agencies. While some states prefer not to act
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as recruiters for the federal government, the overriding
concern should be to employ the teenage job seeker.
The absence of recruiters as an explanatory variable in
the regression model is puzzling. It could be that the
higher quality applicant, like one at the other end of the
scale, needs no personalized persuasion to enlist. He may
shop the services on his own and then make his occupational
choice regardless of the size of the recruiting force.
Additionally, the other services' efforts in this market
could overshadow those of the Marine Corps. This would imply
that the monthly enlistments under study have come primarily
from those already predisposed to the Marine Corps. That
is, they would have enlisted by walking into a recruiting
office somewhere; an act which is independent of the number
of recruiters in the area.
C. IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Certainly the models should be updated and refined. The
Box-Jenkins methodology optimally requires over 100 observa-
tions. Hence the time series should be extended as data
becomes available and the analysis repeated. Furthermore,
although this study was done on a national basis, if data
for the explanatory variables is available, the same analysis
techniques may be applied at the District or Recruiting
Station levels. The forecasts produced from continually
updated models could be used to project recruiting depot
workloads, school inputs, skill shortages and overloads,
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logistic needs, and allocation of recruiting resources.
Additionally, the variables in the multiple regression model
could be experimented with and other functional forms could
be tried. Managerial forecasting using multiple regression
analysis and the Box-Jenkins technique is a developed field
of analysis which the Marine Corps may profitably put to





1. General Research Corporation Draft, Supply Estimation of
Enlistees to the Military , by D.M. Amey , A.E. Fechter,
D.W. Grissmer, and G.P. Sica, June 1976.
2. Cook, A. A. , Jr., "Supply of Air Force Volunteers,"
The Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
,
V. 1, p. II-4-2, November 1970.
3. Rand Corporation Report R-14 5 0-ARPA, Military Manpower
and the All-Volunteer Force , by Richard V.L. Cooper,
September 1977.
4. Institute for Defense Analyses Report P-845, Army
Enlistments and the All-Volunteer Force: The Application
of an Econometric Model
, by A.E. Fechter, February 1972.
5. Fechter, A.E., "Impact of Bay and Draft Policy on Army
Enlistment Behavior," The President's Commission on an
All-Volunteer Armed Force , V. 1, November 1970.
6. Gilman, H.J., "The Supply of Volunteers to the Military
Services," The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force , V. 1, p. II-1-10, November 1970.
7. Gray, B.C., "Supply of First-Term Military Enlistees:
A Cross-Section Analysis," The President's Commission on
an All-Volunteer Armed Force , V. 1, II-2-1, November 1970.
8. George Washington University Report 1142, "Compensation
and Non-Compensation Inducements and the Supply of
Military Manpower," by S.E. Haber, 30 July 197 3.
9. Hause , J.C., "Enlistment Rates for Military Service and
Unemployment," Journal of Human Resources , V. 8, Winter
1973.
10. Center for Naval Analyses Report RC-235, Navy Recruiting
in an All-Volunteer Environment , by C. Jehn and H.E.
Carroll, July 1973.
11. Lippman, S.A. and McCall, J.J., "The Economics of Job
Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry , V. 14, June and
September 1976.
12. Lucas, R.E.B., "Hedonic Wage Equations and Psychic Wages
in the Returns to Schooling," American Economic Review ,
V. LXVII, pp. 549-550, September 1977.
79

13. Makridakis, S. and Wheelwright, S.C., Forecasting
Methods for Management , 2d ed. , John Wiley & Sons, 1977
14. Naval Postgraduate School Report NPS55-78-034 , An
Interactive Software Package For Time Series Analysis
,





1. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
2. Department Chairman, Code 55 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Professor P.M. Carrick, Code 54Ca 2
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor F. Russell Richards, Code 55Rh 2
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Major Paul P. Darling, USMC 5
8858 Applecross Lane
Springfield, Virginia 22153







c.l An analysis and fore-
cast of the supply of
first term enlistees to












An analysis and fore-
cast of the supply of
first term enlistees to







^2768 001 02305 4DUDLEY KNOX UBRARY
I
I
I
